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Abstract. To increase employee participation in training activities, the German government 
introduced a large-scale training voucher program in 2008 that reduces training fees by half. 
Based on a randomized field experiment, this paper analyzes whether providing information 
about the existence and the conditions of the training voucher had an effect on actual training 
activities of employees. Because the voucher was newly introduced, only one-fourth of the 
eligible employees knew the voucher exists at the time of the experiment. The information 
intervention informed a random sample of eligible employees by telephone about the program 
details and conditions. The results indicate that the information significantly increased treated 
individuals’ knowledge of the program but had no effect on voucher take-up or participation in 
training activities. Additional descriptive analyses suggest that the reasons for these zero effects 
are that the demand for self-financed training is low and that liquidity constraints do not 
discourage many employees from training participation. 
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In recent years, many European countries have introduced financial aid programs for 
training participation of employees (OECD 2004).1 These programs subsidize individual 
monetary costs for training fees. The political objective of providing financial aid is to increase 
self-financed training activities of the employees. Increasing participation in lifelong learning 
is a political aim that was formulated by the strategic framework for European cooperation in 
education and training ‘ET 2020’. While many studies have been concerned with training for 
the unemployed as part of active labor market policies (see e.g. Card et al. 2010 for an 
overview), much less is known about the effectiveness of financial aid to increase training 
participation of the employed population.  
This study analyzes whether a newly introduced voucher program in Germany that 
reduces individual training costs by half has the potential to increase employees’ training 
participation. In a randomized field experiment, a treatment group of eligible employees were 
given detailed information by telephone about the voucher, its conditions and how to obtain it. 
Both the treatment and the control group were drawn from a representative sample of eligible 
employees and they were not aware of participating in an experiment at any time. At the time 
of the first interview, only one-fourth of the eligible employees knew of the existence of the 
voucher program which could be the reason why in the overall population the number of issued 
vouchers was low shortly after voucher introduction. Comparing the treatment groups’ voucher 
take-up in a follow-up survey one year later with the corresponding outcomes of the control 
group reveals whether it is the information constraint or whether it is the voucher itself that is 
responsible for low take-up rates. If the reasons for low voucher take-up are due to the design 
and the conditions of the voucher, the voucher will not be effective in raising training levels.  
Our paper is related to different strands of the literature. We contribute to the literature 
being concerned with the effects of financial aid for educational attainment that was most often 
investigated with respect to schooling and tertiary education (see e.g. Deming and Dynarski 
2010 for a review). With respect to financial aid for training, Schwerdt et al. (2012) and Hidalgo 
et al. (2014) show that training levels can be slightly increased by training vouchers that 
reimburse a fixed amount of the training costs which allows individuals to participate in training 
without bearing any of the training costs. In contrast to such vouchers, many of the voucher 
programs introduced at the European level rather finance a fixed share of the costs and require 
self-financing of the remaining training costs. Thus, our findings have important implications 
from a public policy point of view.  
Because our field experiment comprises an information treatment about the voucher, we 
also contribute to the literature analyzing the role of information about financial aid on aid take-
up and educational choice.2 In particular, Dinkelman and Martínez (2014) show that informing 
8th grade students about how to finance higher education increases the probability that they will 
                                                          
1 Examples include Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the UK and Switzerland.  
2 The literature also analyzes e.g. the role of information regarding the returns to education on educational decisions 
(see, e.g., Jensen 2010, Oreopoulos and Dunn 2013) and aspirations (McGuigan et al. 2012) as well as the role of 
information about school quality on school choice and student achievement (Hastings and Weinstein 2008). For 





enroll in a college preparatory high school and reduces absence from school. Bettinger et al. 
(2012) provide evidence that financial aid information alone does not increase college 
attendance unless applicants are given assistance with filling out a lengthy application form. 
Additionally, Booij et al. (2011) reveal that informing students about loans does not affect their 
behavior with respect to loan take-up. Our analysis examines adult education investment 
decisions that are undertaken after having entered the labor market. To our knowledge, we are 
the first to relieve the information constraints on training subsidies for the group of employees. 
Training decisions differ from decisions regarding college enrollment because they are less 
costly, much shorter in duration, occur more frequently and involve much lower opportunity 
costs because training usually occurs while employed, thus requiring no break in employment.  
The main results indicate no significant effect of the information intervention on training 
activities measured at the extensive and intensive margin, i.e. by training incidence and the 
number of courses attended. This is because the intervention did not affect voucher take-up of 
the treatment group. We can rule out that this insignificant effect is due to an ineffective 
information treatment because the intervention did increase program knowledge one year after 
the treatment by a significant 8 to 9 percentage points, representing a 30-percent knowledge 
increase compared with the control group. The insignificant effect on voucher take-up can also 
not be attributed to small samples sizes (3,110 individuals participated in both panel waves) 
and limited statistical inference because power calculations reveal that an effect size for voucher 
take-up of as little as 0.6 percentage points would have turned statistically significant. We 
conclude that other reasons than the lack of information were responsible for not taking up the 
voucher and, thus, for not increasing training of the eligible employees.  
Based on descriptive analyses, we additionally discuss reasons for why the voucher was 
ineffective in raising training quotas. This is another novel aspect of our paper that is 
particularly relevant for policy. We suggest that the non-existent intervention effect on voucher 
take-up is because reducing training costs by half does not increase the demand for self-financed 
training. This might be the case because most employees are able to satisfy their training needs 
with financial support of their employers.3 Furthermore, non-participants in training report as 
most important reasons for non-participation to have no training demand, no time for training 
participation or low expected training returns. And the small share of employees who could not 
participate in training because of liquidity constraints are often not able to bear the remaining 
half of the training costs after redeeming the voucher. We suggest that our conclusions apply to 
other voucher programs which have a similar design as the German voucher. Policy makers 
planning to introduce training vouchers should put effort into analyzing the specific reasons for 
non-participation in training before designing and introducing a voucher. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the voucher 
program and section 3 describes the data, the experimental design and the empirical strategy. 
Section 4 documents the main results, section 5 discusses them in detail and section 6 
concludes.  
                                                          





2. Background: The voucher program  
The training voucher program Bildungsprämie (henceforth, the “BP voucher”) was 
implemented in Germany in December 2008. In 2010 and 2011, the years of interest in this 
paper, the voucher reduced direct training costs by up to 50% for a maximum subsidy of 500 
Euro and was targeted at employees.4 Direct costs cover fees for participation in training 
courses that are charged by the providers of training. The voucher could be used for training at 
the vast majority of German training providers. The goals of the program were to increase the 
participation of employees in training activities, to enable them to individually finance lifelong 
learning activities and not only to participate in training financed by their employer. Training 
that was partly or fully financed by the employer was excluded from the subsidy. Note that 
employers are generally the major source of financing for training, not only in Germany but in 
Europe in general (Bassanini et al. 2007).  
Eligibility for the BP voucher was pegged to several criteria. First, the voucher was only 
available for employees and self-employed workers with low or medium income. The income 
thresholds for taxable household income were 25,600 Euro per year for singles and 51,200 Euro 
for married couples. Approximately two-thirds of all employees (around 25 million) meet these 
income criteria. The unemployed were not eligible for the program but instead had access to 
active labor market programs. Second, only work-related training could be co-financed with 
the voucher and the voucher could not be used for training that had started before the voucher 
was issued or for training that was offered by the employer of the applicant. Third, the direct 
training costs that remained after deducting the voucher had to be borne by the applicants 
themselves; i.e., the voucher could not be combined with employer support or other public 
subsidies. Vouchers were issued in person at one of the 500 counselling offices located all over 
Germany. Counselling served the purpose of verifying the eligibility criteria and recording the 
training content on the voucher. The number of vouchers issued per person was restricted to 
one per year. When booking a course at a training provider, the voucher reduced individuals’ 
fees immediately. Training providers were reimbursed by a governmental agency after 
submitting the voucher to the agency.  
Next, we present results from administrative data regarding all vouchers and voucher 
users (RWI et al. 2012). The number of vouchers issued per year increased from approximately 
63,000 in 2010 to 95,000 in 2011. With respect to the number of eligible employees, the share 
of program users equals 0.4 percent in 2011 (95,000/25,000,000=0.4 percent). The average 
redemption rate of vouchers was 78%. RWI et al. (2012) further show that the program users 
were a highly selective group and not representative for the sample of eligible employees. For 
example, 74% of program users were women compared with the corresponding share of 53 
percent among the group of eligible employees. Approximately 17% were working as physical 
therapists, although their share within the group of eligible employees is less than 1 percent. 
The likely reason for this discrepancy is that women working in the health sector (including 
physical therapists) participate more frequently in self-financed training (with no financial 
involvement on the part of their employer), i.e., they participate more often in training that 
                                                          
4 The maximum voucher subsidy is high compared to the average costs paid by German training participants who 





could potentially be financed by the voucher. In conclusion, the voucher was particularly 
attractive for a certain group of employees who sponsor training on their own with no employer 
involvement.  
 
3. Experimental design, data and empirical strategy  
3.1 Experimental design and data  
The information intervention was implemented for a representative sample of eligible 
employees. The target population was drawn from administrative records of the social security 
system containing the income biography of employees, excluding self-employees and civil 
servants. Thus, the effect of the intervention is only representative of the sample of salaried 
employees, who, however, account for the vast majority of individuals eligible for the BP 
voucher (almost 90 percent of eligible employees are salaried and not self-employed or civil 
servants).5 Eligible employees were initially interviewed by telephone in 2010, and the follow-
up survey was administered approximately one year later in 2011. To avoid interviewees 
becoming aware of taking part in an experiment and to rule out unit nonresponse being 
systematically related to respondents’ previous training participation or financial aid utilization, 
the telephone survey was labeled “Employment today and tomorrow”. The information 
intervention was conducted at the end of the first interview, after general information on socio-
demographics, employment aspects and previous training participation was collected. The 
second wave updated this general information, including information on the outcome variables 
of interest for the main analyses. At no time were respondents informed that they were part of 
an experiment.  
The information intervention was randomly assigned to a 50-percent sample of the 
eligible survey respondents.6 The intervention informed interviewees about the BP voucher, 
how to apply for and use it. The information was provided interactively; interviewees were 
asked to rate the attractiveness of the program and its conditions. They were also asked to 
indicate which sources they would use to inform themselves about the program and one of the 
answer categories contained the exact URL of the program webpage. In total, six questions 
were posed, as shown in Appendix A-2. The interactive method of informing about the program 
was chosen to support respondents’ concentration and motivation as opposed to an intervention 
that provided information with no further involvement by the respondents. Overall, the 
intervention took approximately 5 minutes of the interview. The control group did not receive 
any such information as part of the interview. 
                                                          
5 A more detailed description of the sampling design of the survey can be found in Appendix A-1.  
6 The random assignment occurred at the level of the interviewees, not at the level of the interviewers. The 
interviewers did not know at the beginning of each interview whether they were talking to an individual from the 
treatment or the control group. This is because the CATI-questionnaires were completely the same for both groups 
until the end of the interview where the sample split was randomly assigned among those who met the income 
criteria of the program and the intervention was only provided to the treatment group. Thus, we can rule out that 
interviewer-effects systematically correlate with treatment status. In the follow-up survey, interviewers were also 





Six months after the first interview, all participants in the telephone interview received 
a letter for panel maintenance expressing gratitude for participation in the first interview and 
reminding them of the second interview to come. The letter also served the purpose of 
reminding the treatment group about the BP voucher, in particular, by an enclosed flyer whose 
content differed by treatment status. While the flyer informed the control group about first-
wave results on changes in respondents’ work life (how often respondents were confronted with 
new tasks in the workplace and how well they managed to cope with them), the treatment 
groups’ flyer informed them about employees’ training participation and the voucher program, 
including the URL of the program webpage. This information is important because 88 percent 
of the treated individuals stated in the first interview that they would use the internet as a source 
to obtain information about the program. The flyers for the treatment and the control group can 
be found in Appendices A-3 and A-4, respectively.  
In both panel waves, all respondents were asked about their general knowledge about 
financial aid programs in the area of education and training. For each of four programs that are 
available for funding vocational education, college or employee training in Germany, the 
interviewees were asked whether they knew that the program existed. The specific question 
reads as follows: “I will now read out a list of public programs that provide financial support to 
enable participation in training and in education more generally. Please tell me whether you 
have heard about the respective program before or used it.” The BP voucher was one of the four 
programs being presented to the respondents in randomized order. Individuals who knew of the 
BP voucher were also asked about previous program utilization. Of course, in the first 
interview, the treatment group was asked about program knowledge before the information 
intervention was conducted.  
In the first wave, 5,019 interviews were conducted with eligible employees, of whom 
2,501 received the information treatment and 2,518 did not. In the second wave, the sample 
consisted of 1,516 treated individuals and 1,594 individuals from the control group. The 
attrition rate between the first and the second interview was similar for the treatment (39%) and 
the control group (37%). Table 1 displays t-tests on the similarity of the characteristics between 
the treatment and control groups, documenting that the average characteristics for survey 
respondents in the first wave and for respondents in both waves are always balanced. None of 
the considered characteristics differs significantly by treatment status, indicating that the 
treatment and the control group are balanced.7 Note that the balancing tests hold not only for 
the vast majority of socio-demographic and educational variables but also for the level of 
knowledge about the voucher program before the information treatment occurred. In the first 
wave, only one-fifth of the respondents in the treatment and the control group knew that the BP 
voucher program existed (22-23 percent), which means that more than three-quarters of eligible 
employees had never heard about the program two years after its introduction.  
To provide further evidence on the quality of the randomization of the experiment, 
multivariate regressions were run to test the balancing of the treatment and the control group 
                                                          
7 We also tested whether the socio-demographic and educational variables are similar for those who drop out and 
are not interviewed in the second wave. The sample of dropouts is also balanced by treatment status (see Table B-





and to test whether panel attrition is unrelated to the treatment status. Differential attrition was 
tested by regressing panel dropout on treatment status and individual control variables, 
revealing no statistically significant influence of the treatment on attrition (see column 1 of 
Table B-2).8 Furthermore, we regressed the treatment indicator on individual characteristics to 
determine whether the characteristics are jointly significant. Columns 2 and 3 of Table B-2 
show that the F-test of joint significance of the individual characteristics is insignificant for the 
first wave sample (p-value: 0.7203) and for the sample of individuals responding in both panel 
waves (p-value: 0.6546).  
Table 1 is of further interest to describe the average characteristics of eligible 
employees. Women’s share is 53 percent among eligible individuals. This figure is plausible 
because eligibility is tied to the level of income, which tends on average to be lower for women. 
Approximately 40 percent of eligible employees participated in training during the 12 months 
before the first interview and around one-quarter reported having training intentions for the 
coming 12 months; in particular, they indicated on a four-item scale that they intended to 
participate in training “for sure”. Additional analyses combining first and second wave 
information reveal that the training intentions measured in the first wave are good predictors of 
actual participation because more than 75 percent of the individuals realized their plans in the 
second wave. Table 1 also shows that slightly more than one-fourth of eligible employees 
reported being liquidity constrained in the first interview. The dummy variable for liquidity 
constraints are based on a question asking respondents, how easily they could replace a good 
of daily use if it gets broken.9 Individuals responding that they would not be able to replace this 
good were considered constrained. Although this question is of a subjective nature, it is more 
appropriate than household income because it also encompasses differences in household size 
and fixed-payment obligations (either for consumption or loans). A similar question for 
liquidity constraints was also used by Dohmen et al. (2010).  
 
                                                          
8 To test whether attrition is affected by treatment status within subsets of the sample, we also estimated a model 
including a full set of interactions between the treatment indicator and the individual control variables (results not 
shown in the tables). None of the interaction terms is statistically significant from which we conclude that dropout 
was not affected by the treatment status, not even for individuals with particular characteristics.  
9 The wording of the question is the following: “Assume that a basic commodity of daily use such as a television 
set or a sofa gets broken. How easily would you be able to afford 250 Euro to replace the commodity without 





Table 1. Summary statistics and balancing tests  
 
Notes: The table shows summary statistics separately for the treatment and the control group for variables measured in the first wave, i.e., before the information intervention was 
provided. Difference shows the differences in the means by treatment status and the t-stats indicate their significance. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 









Mean Mean Mean Mean
Socio-demographics and training measured in the first wave
Female 0.537 0.525 0.012 0.78 5,019 0.543 0.517 0.025 1.25 3,110
Age < 35 years 0.243 0.246 -0.003 -0.26 4,996 0.206 0.197 0.010 0.63 3,100
Age (35 to < 45 years) 0.264 0.245 0.019 1.36 4,996 0.264 0.245 0.019 1.07 3,100
Age (45 to < 55 years) 0.326 0.338 -0.013 -0.83 4,996 0.349 0.374 -0.025 -1.28 3,100
Age (> 55 years) 0.167 0.170 -0.003 -0.23 4,996 0.181 0.185 -0.003 -0.21 3,100
Migration background 0.208 0.221 -0.013 -1.04 5,015 0.185 0.193 -0.008 -0.53 3,108
Cohabiting with partner 0.772 0.774 -0.002 -0.15 5,019 0.801 0.802 -0.001 -0.07 3,110
Children 0.388 0.371 0.017 1.12 5,019 0.399 0.372 0.027 1.38 3,110
East Germany 0.237 0.246 -0.010 -0.72 5,019 0.225 0.242 -0.017 -1.01 3,110
College 0.178 0.186 -0.008 -0.62 5,003 0.204 0.201 0.003 0.19 3,105
Vocational education 0.750 0.747 0.003 0.22 5,003 0.744 0.747 -0.003 -0.14 3,105
Compulsory education 0.072 0.067 0.005 0.65 5,003 0.052 0.053 -0.001 -0.08 3,105
Training participation in previous year 0.407 0.402 0.005 0.31 5,009 0.425 0.424 0.001 0.04 3,103
Future training plans (next 12 months) 0.236 0.254 -0.017 -1.25 5,004 0.255 0.270 -0.016 -0.86 3,103
Liquidity constraints 0.289 0.275 0.014 1.00 4,976 0.260 0.245 0.015 0.87 3,090
Program knowledge measured in first wave, before providing the information treatment





Eligible employees in the first and second wave 





3.2 Empirical framework  
Because of the random assignment of the treatment, a comparison of individuals’ 
outcomes between the treatment and control group identifies the causal effects of the 
information intervention. The intention-to-treat (ITT) effects that we estimate answer the 
question how the outcomes of interest would evolve, if our information treatment were provided 
to all eligible employees. The outcomes are estimated by the following regression:  
௜ܻ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܶݎ݁ܽݐ௜ ൅ ߛ′ ௜ܺ ൅ ߝ௜             (1) 
where Yi are the second-wave outcomes of individual i, in particular program knowledge, 
program take-up and training activities measured as binary variable (training incidence) and as 
the number of courses attended (training intensity). The training questions refer to work-related 
classroom training such as courses, seminars or lectures in the time between the first and second 
interview. The variable Treat indicates individuals’ assignment to the treatment (1) or to the 
control group (0). The vector X includes control variables such as socio-demographics and 
educational attainment and ߝ is the idiosyncratic error term.  
For outcomes for which there is pre-treatment information available, fixed effects 
regressions can additionally be estimated by the following model:  
௜ܻ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܶݎ݁ܽݐ௜௧ ൅ ߛ′ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߙ௜ ൅ ߱௜௧                          (2) 
where Yit represents the outcomes program knowledge and the binary training indicator of 
individual i at time t (with t=1, 2). As Treat equals one for the treatment group in t=2 and zero 
otherwise, it identifies the difference-in-differences effect. The vector X remains as described 
above, although only time-varying control variables can be incorporated. The variable ߙ௜ 
represents the individual-specific intercept controlling for time-invariant heterogeneity, which 
was found to matter for training decisions (Pischke 2001, Görlitz 2011). Motivated, talented or 
ambitious individuals participate more intensively in training. The idiosyncratic error term is 
indicated by ߱௜௧. The standard errors account for clustering at the individual level. If equations 
(1) and (2) return similar effects in terms of size and significance, this would be an indication 
that the treatment and the control group are also balanced with respect to time-invariant 
unobservables or that time-invariant unobservables do not alter the results.  
 
4. Results  
Intention-to-treat estimates 
Table 2 documents the effects of the information treatment on outcomes that are 
measured one year after providing the intervention. The first column summarizes the effects on 
individuals’ program knowledge, in which the upper and lower panels present estimates of 
equations (1) and (2), respectively. The average knowledge about the program in the control 
group is 28 percent in the second interview; that is, three years after the introduction of the 
program, more than 70 percent of the eligible employees are still unaware of its existence. The 





intervention by a statistically significant 8.4 to 9.0 percentage points. The period between the 
first and second interview is one year, which is a long time compared with other studies that 
measure a change of knowledge between 3 and 7 months after administering the treatment 
(Dinkelmann and Martinez 2011, Booij et al. 2011, Jensen 2010). Thus, the knowledge increase 
in our experiment should be interpreted as a long-term effect. The short-term knowledge 
increase might be higher because people tend to forget information, particularly if it appears to 
be of little relevance to them.10 
Column (2) displays the results of the information treatment on actual program take-up. 
The intervention did not increase program take-up of the treatment group on any reasonable 
statistically significant level. Importantly, the reason for the statistically insignificant result 
cannot be attributed to sample size issues. Power calculations reveal that even a small increase 
in program take-up of 0.6 percentage points would have been sufficient to provide statistically 
significant results at the 5-percent level given the sample size and the control group mean. 
Relating the 0.6 to the average knowledge increase of the treatment group shows that the 
coefficient on program take-up would have become statistically significant if only one out of 
15 individuals (=0.6 ppt /9.0 ppt) who learned about the program by the intervention had 
obtained a training voucher. Furthermore, note that the share of voucher recipients in the control 
group is approximately the same (0.5 percent) as the share of voucher recipients in the entire 
population of eligible individuals (0.4 percent; see the second section).  
Although there is no effect on program take-up, an effect of the intervention on 
individuals’ training activities could emerge, if the information affected training through 
channels other than reducing training costs by utilizing the voucher. For instance, learning that 
the government sponsors training might increase employees’ training motivation and intention 
by showing how necessary public agents consider training. Alternatively, the intervention could 
have prompted more information about the program being gathered on the internet, ultimately 
resulting in use of another public program subsidizing training. Although there are few financial 
aid programs in Germany, the BP voucher clearly being the most far-reaching, there are 
alternative voucher programs that finance training in a few federal states.11 The effect of the 
information treatment on training activities is documented in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2. 
There are no statistically significant effects of the intervention on the training activities of the 
treatment group. Additionally, the size of the point estimates is small compared with the second-
wave control group mean in the case of both the cross-sectional model and the fixed effects 
model (see first row of Table 2). As a robustness check, the Appendix Table B-3 shows the 
equivalent results when re-estimating all regressions excluding the covariates, which leaves the 
main results unaffected.  
                                                          
10 Already in 1885 Hermann Ebbinghaus showed that the ability to recover information from memory declines 
when the retention interval increases, specifically if information is meaningless for an individual. 
11 See Görlitz (2010) for an evaluation of a state-specific German voucher program that not only allowed access 





Table 2: Effects of the information treatment on program knowledge, take-up and training  
 
Notes: The cross-sectional models regress the second-wave outcomes on a treatment indicator and control 
variables measured in the first interview (i.e., gender, age, migrant, partner, children, East Germany, education 
dummies, previous training participation, training intentions and liquidity constraints). The fixed effects models 
include as covariates children and education dummies. When omitting the control variables, the effects are virtually 
the same (see Table B-3 in the Appendix). Standard errors are robust (in the cross-sectional models) or account 
for clustering at the individual level (in the fixed effects models). Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** 
p < 0.01.  
 
Heterogeneity of treatment effects 
Because the reasons for non-participation in training might be manifold and because the 
voucher only affects financial reasons or cost-benefit considerations, one would not necessarily 
expect homogeneous treatment effects from the information intervention in the group of treated 
individuals. Instead, the highest possible effects should be observed for individuals with 
training intentions or with liquidity constraints. Table 3 summarizes the results of subgroup 
analyses, particularly cross-sectional regressions accounting for heterogeneity in several 
dimensions. Individuals with definite training intentions in the first interview are considerably 
more likely to have remembered the information about the voucher program until the second 
interview. The information treatment increased the knowledge of these individuals by 13 
percentage points (p-value: 0.001), nearly two times that of individuals with no intentions (7 
percentage points). This result is evidence that the knowledge increase was more pronounced 
for individuals most inclined to participate in training, i.e., those for whom the information was 
more relevant. Nevertheless, the group with training intentions did not take up the voucher more 
often; nor did their training activities increase significantly.  
 
Outcomes measured one year following the intervention
Control group mean 0.278 0.005 0.445 1.111
Cross-sectional model
Effect of information intervention 0.084 *** 0.004 0.010 0.087
Control variables
Observations 3,056 3,052 3,058 3,058
Fixed effects model
























Table 3: Heterogeneous effects of the intervention  
 
Notes: The heterogeneous effects are estimated based on the cross-sectional model including an additional 
interaction term between the treatment indicator and the first-wave training intentions. Also, interactions between 
the treatment dummy and a measure of liquidity constraints is considered. Last, the treatment variable is interacted 
with an indicator for previous non-participants in training who mention financial costs as their main reason for 
non-participation. When omitting the control variables, the effects are virtually the same (see Appendix Table B-
3). All regressions are estimated by OLS with robust standard errors. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01.  
  
Outcomes measured one year following the experiment
Training intentions
Effect of information intervention (a) 0.069 *** 0.004 0.021 0.094
Treatment × training inten- 0.058 -0.001 -0.044 -0.028
tions measured in the 1st wave (b)
Observations 3,056 3,052 3,058 3,058
Liquidity constraints 
Effect of information intervention (c) 0.084 *** 0.007 0.020 0.104
Treatment × liquidity constraints (d) 0.003 -0.010 -0.039 -0.068
Observations 3,056 3,052 3,058 3,058
Effect of information intervention (e) 0.078 *** 0.004 0.014 0.091
Treatment × financial burden 0.123 -0.002 -0.081 -0.084
as reason for non-participation (f)











(1) (2) (3) (4)
(0.021) (0.004) (0.021) (0.070)
(0.045) (0.007) (0.038) (0.198)
0.722
(0.022) (0.004) (0.021) (0.088)
0.001 *** 0.543 0.487
(0.145)
0.015 ** 0.482 0.550 0.754
0.9560.009 *** 0.209 0.299
(0.156)
(0.019) (0.003) (0.018) (0.075)
p-value of Wald test of (a)+(b)
p-value of Wald test of (c)+(d)
p-value of Wald test of (e)+(f)







The second dimension of heterogeneity, i.e., the liquidity constraints, is derived from 
the theoretical consideration that the cost component of the training investments is a larger 
obstacle for liquidity constrained individuals. The results reveal that the joint effect of the 
information together with its interaction term with liquidity constraints differs significantly 
from zero in the regression using program knowledge as the dependent variable (p-value: 0.015) 
but the magnitude of the knowledge differences between constrained and non-constrained 
individuals is modest. Furthermore, program take-up and training activities also remain 
unaffected by the intervention for the group of constrained individuals. A third dimension of 
heterogeneity is analyzed by using a question posed in the first wave to non-participants of 
training requesting whether the main reason for non-participation was the financial cost.12 This 
question combines the general willingness to participate in training with liquidity constraints 
and best approximates the target group of the voucher program. Their knowledge increased by 
as much as 20 percentage points, suggesting once more that remembering the information is 
not random but rather systematically related to the relevance of the information to the 
individual.13 However, once again, there are no statistically significant treatment effects on 
program take-up or training.  
 
IV estimates 
The previously estimated ITT effects answer the question of what would happen to 
training levels, if the information treatment – as it was implemented in the experiment – were 
provided to all eligible employees. We would further like to understand the effect of knowing 
that the program exists on training investments. Local average treatment effects (LATE) are 
estimated based on an IV model where in the second stage the training outcomes are regressed 
on program knowledge and controls. The intervention is used for instrumenting program 
knowledge, which is a strong instrument (in the first stage regression the F-statistic of the 
instrument is 20).14 As mentioned, there could be an effect of the intervention on training 
participation apart from program take-up, for example, by an increase in individuals’ general 
motivation for training or the use of other voucher programs for financing. Table 4 shows the 
IV regression results estimating the effect of program knowledge on the extensive and intensive 
margin of training participation. They document that knowing that the program exists does not 
affect training incidence or intensity at any statistically significant level.  
 
  
                                                          
12 Section 5 provides a more detailed description and analysis of the reasons for non-participation in training.  
13 In line with this finding, the levels-of-processing theory in the psychological literature on cognition argues that 
information individuals are likely to remember best is information that is actively processed for meaning (e.g. 
Smith and Kosslyn 2006). If information is relevant for an individual himself such processing and elaboration on 
its meaning is more likely. 
14 Although we would also like to provide LATE effects of program take-up on training, for instance, to assess the 
size of the deadweight loss of the program, these effects cannot be identified empirically because of a weak first 
stage (see Table 2, column 2 for an insignificant effect of the intervention on program take-up; the F-statistic of 
the excluded instrument in the first stage is 1.67, which is strong evidence of a weak first stage). A weak first-





Table 4. Effect of knowing about the existence of the program on training activities  
 
Notes: The table shows 2SLS estimates. The first column indicates the first-stage estimates. The difference in the 
number of observations compared with Table 2 comes from restricting the sample to observations with complete 
information on program knowledge, treatment status, control variables, training incidence and training intensity. 
All regressions are estimated by linear models with robust standard errors. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
 
Robustness of the results 
One shortcoming of the previous analysis is that the reference period for measuring 
effects on training is the period between the first and the second interview, which covers only 
approximately one year, and this might be a rather short time period for detecting treatment 
effects. For instance, individuals participate in training because they perceive their skills have 
depreciated. Something like this does not necessarily occur frequently and, thus, training 
demands could also arise after a period of more than 12 months. To shed light on this issue, we 
use the second-wave information on training intentions for the next 12 months as an additional 
outcome variable while acknowledging that this outcome must be interpreted with care due to 
the subjective nature of the question. The first two columns of Table 5 summarize the ITT 
effects of the intervention on future training plans. Both the cross-sectional and the fixed effects 
regression return results that do not differ significantly from zero. The last two columns show 
the results of knowing about the program on future training plans, where the knowledge was 
instrumented with the information experiment. As before, there is no significant effect of 
program knowledge on future training plans, which is indicative evidence that the intervention 
and the increase in program knowledge as a result of it also have no effect on training activities 
in the medium term.  
 
  
Effect of information intervention 0.084 ***
Effect of program knowledge 0.122 1.025
Control variables
R2 0.0323 0.2510 0.1516
F-test of excluded instruments 20.21 ***
Observations 3,055 3,055 3,055

















Table 5. Effect of the information treatment and of program knowledge on future training plans  
 
Notes: The dependent variable is future training plans in the next 12 months, measured in the second interview. 
ITT effects indicate the effects of regressing future training plans on treatment status in addition to controls. In the 
cross-sectional model in column (1), the control variables include first-wave information on gender, age, migrant, 
partner, children, East Germany, education dummies, previous training participation, training intentions and 
liquidity constraints. The fixed effects model in column (2) includes as covariates children and education dummies. 
Columns (3) and (4) document the first- and second-stage results of IV regressions, estimating the effect of 
program knowledge on future training plans. The instrument for program knowledge is the indicator for the 
information treatment. All regressions are estimated by linear models with robust standard errors (OLS and IV 
models) or with standard errors clustered at the individual level (fixed effects model). Significance levels: * p < 
0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
 
Another concern with the results could be that the time between the interviews did not 
always amount to exactly twelve months. Although the aim was to schedule the second 
interview 12 months after the first, this timing could not always be achieved because not all 
respondents were reachable by phone during the targeted time. The share of interviews that 
could be scheduled exactly 12 months later is 46 percent, which is almost the same as the share 
of interviews conducted 11 or 13 months after the first interview (48 percent). Only 5 percent 
of the second-wave interviews were administered 9, 10 or 14 months after the first one. Re-
estimating the main results by additionally controlling for the time between the interviews (not 
shown in the tables) leaves OLS and IV results virtually unchanged (e.g., for program 
knowledge and take-up, training activities and future training plans). This result is in line with 
further descriptive analysis revealing that the treatment and the control groups are balanced 
with respect to the time between the interviews (t-stat: 0.71).  
Finally, the previous analyses applied linear regression models, although the dependent 
variables are inherently binary or count data. However, the main results are robust to estimating 
the effects based on non-linear regression models (not shown in the tables). In particular, we 
re-estimated the ITT effects using probit models for program knowledge, program take-up, 
training incidence and future training intentions as well as using a negative binomial model for 
the number of training courses. The sign, magnitude and significance are similar to the main 
results. Additionally, a fixed effects logit model confirms the difference-in-differences results, 
which were estimated by linear fixed effects in the main specification.  
  
Effect of information intervention 0.083 ***
Effect of program knowledge 0.069
Control variables
R2 0.2296 0.0018 0.0322 0.2245
F-test of excluded instruments 19.69 ***
Observations 3,048 3,0486,1023,051
2SLS results

















5. Discussion  
Our main results raise several questions, most importantly why the information about 
the program did not increase voucher take-up and, as a consequence, training. This section 
offers answers that are based on further descriptive analyses of the survey questions. As part of 
the information intervention, treated individuals were asked to assess the conditions of the 
voucher (see Appendix A-2 for the survey questions). Overall, the responses show that the 
treatment group is positive toward the idea of government financial support for training. Almost 
96 percent view government training incentives in the form of BP vouchers as very good or 
good. Treated individuals were additionally asked whether they would be willing to participate 
in a 30-minute counselling session to obtain the voucher and how long they would be willing 
to travel to the counselling office. Two-thirds state that they would participate in counselling 
even when traveling takes 30 minutes or more. Individuals were also asked whether they could 
imagine participating in training using the BP voucher during the next 12 months and 34 percent 
stated that they could imagine doing so. In summary, we conclude that visiting a counselling 
office is not an obstacle for voucher take-up for most of the eligible employees and one-third 
of the respondents could imagine to use the voucher in the future. Why, then, have there been 
no effects of the information treatment on voucher take-up?  
The purpose of the BP voucher is to relax the liquidity constraints of individuals who 
could not afford to finance training. To gauge whether financial restrictions have the potential 
to discourage employees from participation, individuals were asked in the first interview about 
their reasons for non-participation in the past. Specifically, non-participants in the first 
interview were presented a list of potential reasons of which they were asked to identify the 
most relevant reasons that applied to them. In the treatment and the control group alike, 15 
percent of all non-participants identified the financial burden as the main reason for non-
participation. This corresponds to only 5 percent of all employees eligible for the BP voucher, 
which we assess as being a rather small sub-group. More importantly, because voucher 
utilization requires self-financing of the other half of the training costs, this sub-group with low 
financial liquidity might not be able to afford paying the other half of the training costs that 
remains after deducting the voucher. Indeed, as many as 58 percent indicated at the time of the 
first interview that they would not be able to replace a good used daily if broken, which differs 
greatly from the mean of 24 percent of the entire treatment group. In summary, there is only a 
small group of eligible employees for whom liquidity constraints are the main reason for non-
participation in training and who could afford paying the other half of the costs.  
Note that 85 percent of the non-participants reported other main reasons for previous 
non-participation in training activities. In particular, 23 percent of the non-participants stated 
that they had no need for training, 19 percent mentioned health- and family-related reasons, 19 
percent had no time for training, 10 percent expected low returns, 7 percent did not know which 
training would be useful and 7 percent reported that the training supply was insufficient. As the 
BP voucher is designed especially to remove financial barriers for non-participation, it is not 






Another issue that we want to discuss is why we do not observe deadweight losses for 
those individuals with training participation in the time period between the interviews. Since 
almost half of the treatment group have participated in training between the first and the second 
wave, we would have expected to observe voucher take-up among this group of individuals to 
co-finance training that they would have attended even in the absence of the voucher. To 
determine why there is no deadweight loss, the following descriptive analysis identifies all 
courses that could have potentially been financed by the voucher. As mentioned previously, 
most training courses in Germany are at least partly employer financed, excluding them from 
voucher eligibility as the BP voucher exclusively subsidizes self-financed training; courses 
financed or provided by the employer are not covered. In the second interview, individuals 
report whether their training activities between the interviews involved costs for training fees 
and whether employers defrayed at least some of these costs. Since most training of employees 
is fully or partly financed by employers, the share of individuals with training participation in 
at least one course that involves self-financing without any co-financing by employers is only 
5 percent of all treated individuals. Furthermore, vouchers cannot be applied to training that is 
publicly financed by another financial aid program. Individuals were also asked whether they 
participated in training while employed or while unemployed of whom only the former could 
be subsidized by the BP voucher. Restricting the sample of eligible employees to training 
participants who additionally fulfill these criteria leads to an overall share of individuals who 
could have potentially used the voucher of less than 4 percent.  
When this group is further reduced to those willing to participate in the counselling 
despite a travel time of 30 minutes or more, the share falls to 2 percent. In absolute numbers, 
this share corresponds to only 28 individuals in the treatment group. 45 percent of these 
individuals have borne costs of less than 100 Euro and approximately 25 percent costs between 
100 and 200 Euro.15 Further deleting those individuals whose self-financed training costs were 
below 200 Euro leaves only 9 individuals for whom the voucher could have been an attractive 
option. In conclusion, we observe only a small number of eligible employees whose training 
activities between the first and the second interview could potentially have been subsidized by 
the voucher, mainly because most courses were fully or partly financed by employers. This is 
the main reason for not finding evidence of any deadweight losses as a consequence of the 
intervention. Note also that our results imply that within this group of training participants, the 
voucher did not lead to an increased demand for training supplementing the employer-
sponsored courses. We suggest as one reason that the overall training needs of employees are 
already satisfied by employer-financed courses.  
 
  
                                                          
15 Using administrative data on voucher recipients, RWI et al. (2012) show that among the total population of 
voucher recipients from 2010, only 3 percent of voucher users participated in training with total costs of less than 
100 Euro and 7 percent participated in training that cost between 100 and 200 Euro. In turn, 90 percent of the 
voucher recipients used the voucher for training that cost more than 200 Euro, suggesting that the likelihood of 






This paper analyzes the effects of providing information about a training voucher 
program on voucher take-up and training participation. The voucher decreases a substantial 
amount of the training costs for employees. The analysis is conducted based on a field 
experiment with random assignment of the treatment group. The results suggest that the 
information intervention increased the treatment groups’ program knowledge significantly 
compared with the control group. However, relieving the information constraint had no effect 
on voucher take-up or training activities. These results indicate that increasing eligible 
employees’ general program knowledge, e.g., by allocating more resources to public relations 
work, would neither increase program take-up nor raise training levels. Because increased 
training levels by means of the voucher require voucher take-up at first, the results also indicate 
that the voucher is ineffective to increase the training participation quota of the employed 
population at large.  
Descriptive results indicate that the reason for the inability of the voucher to stimulate 
training is that the financial burden is seldom the main reason for not participating in training. 
Many employees participate in employer-financed training with no personal financial 
involvement. The majority of non-participants in training report other reasons for previous non-
participation such as no time, no training demands or low expected training returns. Only 5 
percent of the eligible employees report the financial burden as being responsible for previous 
non-participation. However, for many of this small sub-group, bearing half of the training costs 
seems to be an obstacle for voucher take-up, as this particular group is characterized by 
particularly scarce financial resources. Comparing our results with those from Schwerdt et al. 
(2012) and Hidaldo et al. (2014) who analyze vouchers that do not necessarily require a 
financial contributions of the individuals and who find positive effects on voucher take-up and 
training suggest that paying half of the training costs might be an obstacle for increasing training 
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Appendix A  
Appendix A-1. Sampling design of data  
As described in section 2, the BP voucher is available to individuals with low taxable 
household income, if they are employed, self-employed or on maternity/parental leave. Because 
there is no single source of data from which to draw a sample of these individuals and for 
reasons of cost efficiency, the survey primarily focused on salaried employees. The survey 
sample was drawn from administrative records covering all employees contributing to the social 
security system. Defining the eligibility status of the target population, which depends on 
taxable household income, is not straightforward based on the information covered in the 
administrative records because they only include individuals’ labor income. Information on 
marital status, partner’s income and income from sources other than labor are missing. 
Therefore, it was instead necessary to ask all relevant questions in the survey and then decide 
about eligibility during the interview. To minimize the number of interviews with non-eligible 
individuals, the survey sample was drawn from all individuals who were employed in December 
2008 and was stratified by gender and labor income; i.e., individuals with low labor income 
were sampled with a higher probability than individuals with high labor income. In the analysis, 
the stratification is accounted for by using sample weights. Note that the main results for 
program knowledge, program take-up and training activities are similar when using an 
unweighted sample (results not shown).  
In the first wave in 2010, 6,075 employees were interviewed (corresponding to a 
response rate of 35 percent), of whom 5,019 employees were identified as eligible for the 
program. Eighty-nine percent of the respondents declared their willingness to be contacted for 
a follow-up interview. In the second wave, respondents who had declared their agreement and 
were eligible for the program, were contacted again. Overall, 3,110 interviews were conducted 






Appendix A-2: Questions in the experiment  
Q1 “I would like to talk to you about the Bildungsprämie program. The Bildungsprämie 
is a voucher program whereby the government finances half of the costs incurred when you 
participate in training for vocational reasons. More specifically, for training costs up to 1000 
Euro, the government reimburses 50 Percent of the cost. For example, if a person participates 
in training at a cost of 800 Euro, 400 Euro are reimbursed. How do you personally rate the idea 
of the government providing financial support for training participation?” (very good/partly 
good/partly not so good/not good at all)  
Q2 “You can obtain information on the Bildungsprämie from various sources. There is 
a webpage ‘www.bildungsprämie.info’ and a toll-free hotline. You can also order a flyer that 
is sent to you by mail or visit one of the counselling offices or the roadshow. Assuming you 
would like to get more information on the Bildungsprämie, which of the sources of information 
would you probably use?” (yes/no; webpage, toll-free hotline, flyer, counselling office, 
roadshow)  
Q3 “To obtain the Bildungsprämie voucher, you have to apply for it in a counselling 
office. Counselling takes approximately 30 minutes and verifies that you meet the eligibility 
criteria. If you do, the voucher is issued. Would you be willing to take part in such counselling 
to obtain financial support?” (yes/no) 
Q4 “During counselling, individual advice on training topics that might be helpful or 
information on particular courses are available (if demanded by the applicant). Assuming that 
you would like to participate in training, do you feel sufficiently informed about training 
opportunities or do you require more information?” (yes, I require more information/no, I do 
not require more information) 
Q5 “Currently, there are approximately 400 counselling offices across Germany. What 
is the most amount of time you would be willing to spend travelling to a counselling office?” 
(hours, minutes) 
Q6 “Can you imagine participating in training within the next 12 months and using the 








Appendix A-3. The information flyer for the treatment group 
 











Appendix A-4. The information flyer for the control group  
 










Appendix B. Additional tables 
Table B-1. Summary statistics and balancing of panel dropouts  
 
Notes: The table shows summary statistics of individuals dropping out of the panel after the first interview 
separately for the treatment and the control group. Difference shows the differences in the means by treatment 







Socio-demographics and training measured in the first wave
Female 0.528 0.538 -0.010 -0.39 1 909
Age < 35 years 0.301 0.334 -0.033 -1.41 1 896
Age (35 to < 45 years) 0.265 0.246 0.019 0.84 1 896
Age (45 to < 55 years) 0.289 0.276 0.013 0.57 1 896
Age (> 55 years) 0.145 0.145 0.001 0.03 1 896
Migration background 0.246 0.271 -0.026 -1.16 1 907
Cohabiting with partner 0.724 0.724 0.001 0.03 1 909
Children 0.370 0.369 0.002 0.07 1 909
East Germany 0.255 0.254 0.001 0.06 1 909
College 0.136 0.160 -0.024 -1.23 1 898
Vocational education 0.759 0.747 0.012 0.54 1 898
Compulsory education 0.104 0.093 0.012 0.80 1 898
Training participation in previous year 0.378 0.363 0.014 0.57 1 906
Future training plans (next 12 months) 0.207 0.225 -0.018 -0.82 1 901
Liquidity constraints 0.335 0.327 0.008 0.35 1 886
Program knowledge measured in first wave, before providing the information treatment
Knowledge about the Bildungsprämie 0.2380 0.2292 0.009 0.41 1 903







Table B-2. Differential attrition and balancing tests based on multivariate regressions  
 
Note: The dependent variables are indicated in the column headings. Covariates are measured in the first 
wave. All results were estimated using the linear probability model. Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** 
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
  
Information intervention 0.020
Female 0.002 0.015 0.030
Age < 35 years
Age (35 to < 45 years) -0.090 *** 0.014 -0.006
Age (45 to < 55 years) -0.143 *** -0.007 -0.034
Age (> 55 years) -0.147 *** 0.002 -0.015
Migration background 0.059 *** -0.021 -0.020
Cohabiting with partner -0.044 ** -0.004 -0.002
Children -0.020 0.017 0.025
East Germany 0.037 ** -0.017 -0.031
College -0.165 *** -0.028 0.016
Vocational education -0.107 *** -0.022 0.004
Compulsory education
Training participation in -0.022 0.013 0.004
previous year
Training planned in -0.027 -0.030 -0.028
next 12 months
Liquidity constraints 0.062 *** 0.017 0.021
R2
F-statistic

































































Table B-3. Re-estimation of main results excluding all control variables  
 
Notes: The cross-sectional models regress the second-wave outcomes on a treatment indicator. The heterogeneous 
effects are estimated based on the cross-sectional model, including an additional interaction term between the 
treatment indicator and, first, the training intentions in the first wave, second, a measure of liquidity constraints 
and, third, an indicator for previous non-participants in training who mention financial costs as the main reason 
for non-participation. The fixed effects model includes no covariates apart from the treatment indicator. Standard 
errors are robust (in the cross-sectional models) or account for clustering at the individual level (in the fixed effects 
models). Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
Outcomes measured one year following the experiment
Panel A: Cross-sectional model
Effect of information intervention 0.084 *** 0.004 0.005 0.061
Observations 3,107 3,103 3,109 3,109
Panel B: Fixed effects model
Effect of information intervention 0.086 *** 0.005
Observations 6,211 6,212
Panel C: Heterogeneous effects
Training intentions
Effect of information intervention (a) 0.068 *** 0.004 0.018 0.075
Treatment × training inten- 0.066 0.000 -0.019 0.039
tions measured in the 1st wave (b)
Observations 3,100 3,096 3,102 3,102
Liquidity constraints 
Effect of information intervention (c) 0.088 *** 0.007 0.016 0.093
Treatment  × liquidity constraints (d) -0.009 -0.011 -0.034 -0.087
Observations 3,087 3,083 3,089 3,089
Effect of information intervention (e) 0.079 *** 0.004 0.010 0.069
Treatment × financial burden 0.104 -0.004 -0.097 -0.162
as reason for non-participation (f)
Observations 3,095 3,091 3,097 3,097
0.183 0.478
Financial burden main reason for previous non-participation in training
p-value of Wald test of (e)+(f) 0.021 ** - 
(0.082)
(0.082) (0.003) (0.068) (0.154)
p-value of Wald test of (a)+(b)
























0.001 *** 0.507 0.961 0.546
0.027 ** 0.431 0.626
(0.160)
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